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IN SEARCH OF A UNIFYING PRINCIPLE
FOR ARTICLE V OF THE UNIFORM TRUST CODE:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR DANFORTH
Jeffrey A. Schoenblum*
Professor Robert Danforth's exploration of spendthrift trusts in
Article Five of the UTC and the Future of Creditors 'Rights in Trusts1 is a
superb piece of work. Professor Danforth analyzes with considerable
acuity the ins and outs of the specific rights creditors and beneficiaries of
trusts have under the Uniform Trust Code (UTC). His article clearly
represents the most detailed analysis of the new Code's approach to
spendthrift trusts.
Professor Danforth is determined to establish that Article V is not as
creditor-friendly as its critics claim.2 His article is essentially an apologia,
coupled with some proposed modifications so as to leave no doubt about
this. However, in his zeal to defend Article V and refute the contention
that it is too creditor-friendly, Professor Danforth strikingly ignores its
manifold shortcomings. Article V is a missed opportunity to legislate a
coherent theory of creditor rights and spendthrift protections. As drafted,
it is a disappointing amalgam of often contradictory, formalistic rules.
In a number of other areas of trust law, the drafters of the Code have
introduced significant departures from traditional trust law principles.3
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
Robert T. Danforth, Article Five of the UTC and the Future of Creditors 'Rights in Trusts, 27
CARDOZO L. REv. 2551 (2006).
2 Professor Danforth identifies two attorneys, Mark Merric and Steven J. Oshins, as Article V's
principal critics. See id. at 2555-57 nn. 16-29 and accompanying text. Indeed, Professor Danforth
appears to be particularly preoccupied with Mr. Merric, whose argumentation is described as "often
murky, making it a challenge to formulate a response. Second, his writings are hyperbolic ....
Finally, an essential premise for his position-the status of creditors under the common law-is, in
my view, incorrectly understood or, at least, incorrectly described." Id. at 2555 n.20.
3 One notable example is the recognition given to the noncharitable purpose trust, dispensing
with the traditional sine qua non of trust beneficiaries. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 409 (2005).
Significantly, the noncharitable purpose trust has its origins offshore. However, the Code
noncharitable purpose trust is intended to be more limited. See David M. English, The Uniform Trust
Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 168-69 (2002)
(explaining that the drafters of the Code "specifically elected not to follow the offshore islands in
their liberal authorization of the noncharitable purpose ... trust"). See generally Alexander A. Bove,
Jr., The Purpose of Purpose Trusts, PROB. & PROP., May/June 2004, at 34; Paul Matthews,from
Obligation to Property, and Back Again? The Future of the Non-Charitable Purpose Trust, in
EXTENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF TRUSTS AND SIMILAR RING-FENCED FUNDS 203 (David Hayton
ed., 2002).
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Thus, Professor Danforth's routine invocation of tradition4 or the
"majority-of-states" 5 position as justification for adoption of the bulk of
Article V falls short. Likewise, Professor Danforth's standard refrain that
a particular rule does not really matter because a state can decide not to
adopt the provision6 also proves inadequate. It suggests lack of interest on
the part of the drafters in formulating a principled and coherent body of
trust law. In fact, the Code itself sends a mixed message. In some
respects, the drafters' conception of the Code's purpose is quite
unambitious. They describe the Code as an effort to afford "precise,
comprehensive, and easily accessible guidance on trust law questions." 7
There is no indication of a purpose to reformulate, or to offer up a
systematic body of law founded on certain consistent, tested principles.
In this vein, while Professor Danforth defends Article V on the
ground that it really is beneficiary-friendly, his article fails to present any
normative defense of this orientation. Presumably, he assumes that this is
the correct position. But if, normatively, the correct policy is to favor
creditors' interests, then Professor Danforth's contention that, in fact,
Article V is beneficiary-friendly, strikingly misses the point.
The drafters, too, have chosen not to engage in a searching normative
inquiry, but appear to have simply accepted the traditional rules as the
baseline. As that baseline was the product of a less-than-coherent
amalgam of case law modified by discrete statutory enactments, the Code
has replicated this pre-existing incoherence. This is the critical conclusion
to be drawn from an analysis of the current Article V.
Nowhere is this demonstrated more forcefully than with respect to
section 505 of the Code. Traditionally, a settlor has not been able to
achieve protection from creditors by transferring assets to a trustee,
designating himself as beneficiary, and thereby shielding the transferred
assets from the reach of his creditors.8 Several states, by statute, have now
altered this rule,9 at least when the trustee is a person other than the settlor
and the interests retained by the settlor are discretionary with the trustee or
subject to a meaningful external standard. Notwithstanding these statutory
developments, the drafters of the UTC, following the lead of the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, rejected this approach. 10 The explanation
offered by the Code drafters is "policy grounds,"' l although these are not
4 See, e.g., Danforth, supra note 1, at 2559.
5 See, e.g., id., at 2570.
6 See, e.g., id., at 2591.
7 UNIF. TRUST CODE, prefatory note.
8 Id. § 505 cmt. See generally 2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 156, at 164-86 (4th ed. 1987).
9 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(a)-(b) (Michie 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570-
3576 (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.010 (Michie 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 18-9.2 (2000);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14(a)(ii) (2004).
10 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58(2) & cmt. b (2003).
11 The Comment to Code section 505 states: "The drafters ofthe Uniform Trust Code concluded
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explicitly or implicitly articulated in the accompanying Comment to
section 505.
The refusal to validate self-settled spendthrift trusts is difficult to
reconcile with Article V's general validation of spendthrift trusts. A
spendthrift trust involves two types of restraints on alienation-voluntary
and involuntary. If a settlor wishes voluntarily to restrain his own
discretion and authority to assign his wealth by making it subject to a
spendthrift trust, there does not appear to be a moral or economic basis for
curtailing this. 12 A common criticism of spendthrift trust protection is that
it is paternalistic. 13  It deprives the beneficiary of authority and
responsibility for his credit decisions. Impeding one's own ability to
alienate is certainly less paternalistic than impeding some other
beneficiary's ability to do so. Yet, the Code permits the latter while
denying the former. Thus, to the extent paternalism is not a value to be
fostered, 14 voluntarily imposed self-restraint should be allowed.
As for the restraint on involuntary alienation, the overriding concern
critics have regarding self-settled trusts has been that settlors will incur
debts, but shield their assets from liability. 15 In fact, the likelihood of this
occurring is minimal. 16 As long as fraudulent conveyance laws are
enforced and not easily evaded, 17 the settlor will not be able to impair
creditors' access to the trust assets. When deception is not involved, the
protection afforded the innocent settlor by reliance on the spendthrift trust
is no different from the protection afforded to beneficiaries other than the
settlor. If the settlor was not insolvent and was not aware of specific
that traditional doctrine reflects sound policy." UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505 cmt.
12 For a thorough examination of this issue and a similar conclusion, see Adam J. Hirsch,
Spendthrift Trusts andPublic Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 83-
86 (1995). See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 557-60, 566-69
(7th ed. 2004), for a superb consideration of the issues involved.
13 See generally Hirsch, supra note 12, at 16-17, 45-56. Hirsch refers back to John Chipman
Gray, the venerable critic of the paternalism of the spendthrift trust. Gray argued that spendthrift
protections were characterized "by that spirit, in short, of paternalism, which is the fundamental
essence alike of spendthrift trusts and of socialism." JOHN C. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE
ALIENATION OF PROPERTY, at ix (2d ed. 1895). For an argument that self-settled spendthrift trusts
should not be enforced precisely because the paternalistic element is missing, see Pitrat v. Garlikov,
947 F.2d 419, 424 (9th Cir. 1991). See also Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's
Race to the Bottom, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1044 (2000).
14 The question whether or not paternalistic policies yield more benefits than costs or are
otherwise desirable is precisely the debate the drafters should be having.
15 See, e.g., 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 8, § 156, at 167 ("It is against public policy to
permit a man to tie up his own property in such a way that he can still enjoy it but can prevent his
creditors from reaching it.").
16 The question can be asked: "Is doing business on a handshake something society wants to
discourage to the extent of denying the creditor any access to otherwise unencumbered assets of the
debtor?" Anne S. Emanuel, Spendthrift Trusts: It's Time to Codify the Compromise, 72 NEB. L. REV.
179, 198 (1993). If the answer is "yes," it should apply equally for the settlor-beneficiary as well as
the nonsettlor-beneficiary.
17 See Sterk, supra note 13, at 1046-48. Self-settled offshore asset protection trusts can bypass
domestic fraudulent conveyance laws, id. at 1048-50, and thus may not be deserving of protection.
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claims at the time the trust was created or property was transferred to the
trustee, how have future creditors been abused? Just as when a non-settlor
beneficiary is involved, a creditor can take account of the self-settled
spendthrift trust in fashioning the credit/security package. A review of
traditional authorities, such as Scott on Trusts,18 reveals nothing more than
conclusory pronouncements and "soft" moral criticism of self-settled
spendthrift trusts. The recently drafted Restatement (Third) of Trusts
unfortunately does the same, while failing to offer a more compelling
rationale. 19
By way of contrast, Dean Erwin Griswold, in his classic treatise on
spendthrift trusts, found considerable merit in extending spendthrift
protections, within limits, to self-settled trusts. He questioned why a "man
who earns his own way should [not] have the same opportunity for
protection from adversity as the man who takes his support from others. '20
He also noted the statutory protections for insureds from their creditors and
the statutory protections afforded those who purchase annuities and
disability insurance. 21 These protections from creditors are still widely
observed. 22
Early in his article, Professor Danforth informs the reader that the one
section of Article V that he will not be addressing in depth is section 505.23
Instead, his article devotes considerable space to defending the Code's
elimination of the distinction in treatment of discretionary and support
trusts24 and the Code's requirement of "good faith" on the part of the
trustee.25 Although these are important matters and Professor Danforth is
compelling in arguing that these modifications have not shifted the balance
toward creditors, section 505 is no less important and, indeed, is arguably
of more contemporary significance. The spendthrift trust is no longer
simply a tool for preserving family wealth from the profligacy of family
trust beneficiaries. It is now also promoted offshore26 and, to an increasing
18 See 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 8.
19 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58(2) (2003).
20 ERWlN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS 644 (2d ed. 1947).
21 See id. at 644-45. Admittedly, federal tax law is more expansive in determining when a settlor
has retained economic control for gross income, gross gift, and gross estate purposes. However,
these tax statutes have a distinctive purpose-to raise revenue by defeating schemes that seek to
employ the formalities of property law to escape the taint of ownership. This is not the concern of
spendthrift trusts. Even if it were, the same focus on economic enjoyment of benefits would argue
against spendthrift protection for the non-sellor beneficiary who is entitled to enjoy presently the
benefits of the trust fund.
22 See JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, 2005 MULTISTATE GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING, at tbls. 9.01,
9.02 (2005).
23 See Danforth, supra note 1, at 2557.
24 See id. at 2574-78.
25 See id. at 2597-2602.
26 The size of the offshore asset protection trust market is immense. See ROSE-MARIE BELLE
ANTOINE, TRUSTS AND RELATED TAX ISSUES IN OFFSHORE FINANCIAL LAW 3 (2004).
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degree onshore,27 as a tool for securing private wealth from the quasi-
public depredations of the tort system. 28 Owners of substantial capital, as
well as providers of professional services, anticipating eventual exposure
to liability because of their deep pockets and a manipulative jury system,
seek to insulate their wealth from putative plaintiffs by use of a self-settled
spendthrift trust with a situs for the trust in a jurisdiction that recognizes
and stringently enforces restraints on involuntary alienation.
Section 505 is symptomatic of the overall approach of Article V,
which, unfortunately, seems to have been drafted with less than
thoroughgoing analysis, but with great deference to the grab-bag of
disconnected rules that have gained sway over the course of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. The remainder of this Comment will consider
several of the other provisions of Article V, Professor Danforth's defense
of them, and the root problems and contradictions they reveal.
Section 501 prescribes the rights of creditors when the trust
instrument does not contain a spendthrift clause. The drafters of the Code
have decided on a default rule that generally favors creditor interests and
disfavors spendthrift protection. In contrast, a number of states have
reached the opposite conclusion. 29 Although the Code's position is based
on whether the settlor has expressed a wish for spendthrift protection, there
is more than the settlor's intent at stake. Thus, whether spendthrift
protection should be afforded is a policy matter beyond an inquiry into the
expression of the settlor's intent or, more likely, the particular forms the
drafting attorney happens to utilize.30 If spendthrift protection is desirable
from a public policy standpoint, then beneficiary protection as the default
position is an appropriate outcome, whether or not the magic words have
been intoned so as to establish intent.
In fact, the explanatory Comment to section 501 has nothing at all to
say about why this particular default rule was adopted. Furthermore,
section 501's default rule in favor of creditor rights is in direct conflict
with the rest of Article V, which, as Professor Danforth convincingly
27 See supra note 9.
28 For a further exploration of this perceived threat, see generally Jeffrey A. Schoenblum,
Reaching for the Sky or Pie in the Sky: Is U.S. Onshore Trust Reform an Illusion?, in EXTENDING
THE BOUNDARIES OF TRUSTS AND OTHER RING-FENCED FUNDS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY,
supra note 3, at 291. But see Sterk, supra note 13, for an impressive critique of self-settled
spendthrift trusts. Professor Sterk maintains that small states with few local trust users have an
incentive to attract capital by giving spendthrift protection to the foreign settlor, while exporting the
costs to the settlor's home state and/or other jurisdictions. He also argues for penalties, including
incarceration, to deter use of offshore trusts. But see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death ofLiability, 106
YALE L.J. 1, 38 (1996).
29 For a description ofwhich states have a spendthrift trust default rule in the absence of specific
language, see SCHOENBLUM, supra note 22, tbl. 9.05, pt. 1.
30 See DUKEMINIER, supra note 12, at 548 ("In most jurisdictions, trusts are not spendthrift unless
the settlor expressly insists on a spendthrift clause, but spendthrift provisions are routinely included
in professionally drafted trusts, if only by rote inclusion of formbook boilerplate.").
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argues, supports spendthrift trust protection. 3' No effort is made to explain
this divergence. One might argue that, consistent with the general
historical disfavor shown towards restraints in property law,32 the default
position should be in favor of alienability.33 Again, this flies in the face of
the rest of Article V. For example, rather than requiring difficult-to-satisfy
language, section 502(b) allows for the imposition of voluntary and
involuntary restraints on alienation merely by specifying that the
beneficiary's interest "is held subject to a 'spendthrift trust,' or words of
similar import. ' 34 The accompanying Comment makes clear that the
objective is to liberalize the language required to impose restraints on
alienation, not to impose a harsher standard, so as to limit the enforcement
of such restraints. Thus, were consistency in policy the motivating
concern, section 501's default position, arguably, ought to be spendthrift
protection.
Explaining that trust-related proceedings are equitable in nature, the
Comment to section 501 recognizes that a court "may appropriately
consider the circumstances of a beneficiary and the beneficiary's family. 35
Thus, notwithstanding the default rule just considered, a court, apparently,
may restrict alienability. The Comment fails to explain why under certain
circumstances the default rule should shift; nor does it explain why a
beneficiary and the beneficiary's family should be given preferential
treatment over the beneficiary's other creditors in this regard. The
entitlement of the beneficiary's "family" is also mystifying. Who is
"family?" What entitlement should they have if they have not been named
as beneficiaries by the settlor and may not even be the beneficiary's
dependents? "Needs," too, is left undefined.
The standard invoked by the Comment is also troublesome. The court
"may appropriately consider the circumstances" of the beneficiary and his
family. This is one of those limitless standards that will have one meaning
for one judge and a different meaning for another. Indeed, it represents an
expansion, even beyond the prior language of the Comment, that permitted
consideration of the "support needs" of the beneficiary and his family.
Ironically, then, a settlor who does not wish to insulate his beneficiaries
from their creditors cannot be confident that this outcome can be assured.
Much of the preceding analysis has focused on the Comment to
31 See Danforth, supra note 1.
32 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. (2003). For a superb exploration of the
topic, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1985). For the extreme effects that restraints on alienation can have when
property is held in trust or trust-like constructs, see Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, The Role of Legal
Doctrine in the Decline of the Islamic Waqf" A Comparison with the Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1191, 1206-07 (1999).
33 See GRISWOLD, supra note 20, at 302-04.
34 UNIF. TRUST CODE, § 502(b) (2005).
35 Id. § 501 cmt.
2614 [Vol. 27:6
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section 501. The precise status of the Comment is itself problematic.
Some Code states may not enact the Code with Comment. 36 Even if the
Comment is included as part of the enactment, the authority carried by the
Comment is disputable. In some instances, as with section 501, the
Comment can be regarded as actually running counter to the statutory
language itself and, arguably, ought not be given any weight.
Just as in the case of section 501, section 502 reinforces the
conclusion that the Code's drafters were not focused on developing a
coherent approach to restraints on alienation and creditors' claims. Section
502(a) provides that "[a] spendthrift provision is valid only if it restrains
both voluntary and involuntary transfer of a beneficiary's interest. '37
Professor Danforth argues in defense that this is the traditional rule
observed in most states. 38 However, he offers no explanation as to the
merits of such rule. If the settlor's expression of intent is key, as section
501 indicates, then the settlor ought to be able to limit voluntary alienation
by a beneficiary. To allow the settlor to do so would not interfere with
creditors' rights. Indeed, Professor Austin Scott reached precisely this
conclusion.39
One approach taken by states has been to extend spendthrift
protection to involuntary alienation if the settlor has only expressed an
intent as to voluntary alienation. One rationale offered for this
construction is that the settlor surely intended a restraint on creditors as
well. 40 However, the exclusive reference to a restraint on voluntary
alienation could just as readily be interpreted as implying no intent to
restrain creditors, as the claims of creditors would surely have been taken
into account if a restraint on voluntary alienation was considered.41
36 One such example is the District of Columbia. The Code is set forth in sections D.C. CODE §§
19-1301.01 through 19-1311.03. At the end of each section, the following statement appears: "This
section is based upon §[] of the Uniform Trust Code." The specific section of the Code is indicated.
No reference is made to the Comment. The issue raised has been much debated with regard to the
Uniform Commercial Code. See John M. Breen, Statutory Interpretation and the Lessons of
Llewellyn, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 263,415-18 (2000); see also Gary L. Monserud, JudgmentAgainst
a Non-Breaching Seller: The Cost of Outrunning the Law to Do Justice Under Section 2-608 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 70 N.D. L. REv. 809, 834 n.161 (1994). See generally Sean Michael
Hannaway, Note, The Jurisprudence and Judicial Treatment of the Comments to the Uniform
Commercial Code, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 962 (1990).
37 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502(a) (emphasis added).
38 See Danforth, supra note 1, at 2570.
39 See 2A Scor & FRATCHER, supra note 8, § 152.3, at 179.
40 See GRISWOLD, supra note 20, § 265 (citing older cases, but not offering any basis for this
presumption of settlor intent, especially in light of the general bias against restraints on alienation).
41 The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. b(2) (2003) argues "for reasons of policy"
that a restraint only on voluntary alienation ought to be invalid because it "does not protect the
interests from creditors and is thus insufficiently effective as a practical matter to justify a departure
from the law's general policy against restraints or alienation." But why, "as a practical matter,"
would it not be effective? A settlor might wish to guard against irresponsible voluntary alienation by
a beneficiary who is, for example, susceptible to cult membership, but may not wish to deny
legitimate creditors their rightful due. Moreover, if a restraint on voluntary alienation is not
2615
HeinOnline  -- 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 2615 2005-2006
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
Giving the settlor the option of restraining solely involuntary
alienability is more problematic. Allowing the beneficiary to alienate
freely on a voluntary basis, but barring his creditors from reaching his
beneficial interest, does have a bad odor to it, even if one concludes that
creditors are well-situated to protect their own interests. At worse, then,
section 502 should allow partial spendthrift trusts whereby the restraint is
imposed exclusively on voluntary alienation. 42
Strikingly, section 502 actually denies spendthrift protection
altogether if only one of the restraints on voluntary or involuntary
alienation is sought. This is difficult to rationalize in terms of the
purported beneficiary-friendly character of Article V. It also represents a
break with the approach of the Second 43 and Third Restatements and case
law, 44 which would allow the implication of coverage for the restraint on
alienation not mentioned.
The Comment to section 502 also states that a trustee may "choose to
honor the beneficiary's purported assignment. ' 45 No guidance is given as
to the standard to be applied by the trustee. The rationale for this provision
is difficult to grasp. If the basis for spendthrift trust enforcement is the
settlor's intent, then there seems no reason to allow the beneficiary to
defeat it with the help of a compliant trustee. If the reasoning behind the
Comment is to assist the beneficiary's creditors, this would run counter to
the dominant theme of Article V, according to Professor Danforth46-
insulating the trust assets from the beneficiary's creditors.
The absence of an overarching rationale is placed in especially bold
relief by section 503. On the surface, this section appears to deviate
strikingly from the heretofore general theme favoring restraints on
alienation. Section 503 introduces exceptions for support orders for
current spouses, former spouses, and children, as well as for judgment
creditors who have provided services. In contrast, no exception from
spendthrift protection is afforded for "creditors who have furnished
necessary services or supplies to the beneficiary. '47 There is also no
exception allowed for claims against trust beneficiaries who are
tortfeasors.
The exception for current spouses, former spouses, and children with
a support judgment or court order for support and maintenance is a
predictable, reflexive response by the drafters that is again defended by
Professor Danforth on the ground that it is the majority rule among the
justifiable on its own, then why credit it merely because a restraint on involuntary alienation is
intended?
42 See 2A ScOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 8, § 152.3.
43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 152 cmts. d & e.
44 Id. § 58 cmt. b(3).
45 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502 cmt (2005).
46 See Danforth, supra note 1, at 2569.
47 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 cmt.
[Vol. 27:62616
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states. He also defends the exception on the ground that a state is free to
omit the exception if it wishes to do so. 48
Consideration of the Comment to section 503 reveals that the
exception is more theoretical than real. Access to the trust fund by the
excepted class of persons is actually severely restricted. The Comment
states:
Distributions subject to attachment include distributions required by the
express terms of the trust, such as mandatory payments of income, and
distributions the trustee has otherwise decided to make, such as through
the exercise of discretion. [The provision] does not authorize the
spousal or child claimant to compel a distribution from the trust.49
Indeed, Professor Danforth emphasizes that "an exception creditor's
remedies are quite limited. ' 50 He explains that creditor access to
"distributions" from the trust is far less effective from the creditor's
standpoint than access to the assets of the trust itself. As long as the
trustee does not exercise its discretion and there are no mandated
distributions, the spouse or child is entitled to nothing. This is the case
even if the person is the sole beneficiary and the issue is just one of time
and manner of distribution. It is also the case even if the discretion of the
trustee is limited by an ascertainable standard. 51
The exception provision of section 503(b) reveals an ambivalence that
suffuses Article V. The drafters cannot decide whether to be consistently
pro-beneficiary or pro-creditor. Instead, often when leaning one way or
the other, they cut back in conceptually incoherent ways. The central
question the drafters need to confront is why certain judgment creditors
should be preferred. For example, a former spouse who has a judgment
may not be in "need," while a tradesman may be. Put another way, the
drafters ought to explain why some claims ought to overcome the settlor's
intent and others should not.
A similar questionable exception is granted for those providing
services "for the protection of a beneficiary's interest in the trust." 52 In
sharp contrast, no similar access is granted to those providing "necessary
services or supplies. ' 53 The reduction of rights of creditors who provide
necessary services or supplies is a departure from the Second54 and Third55
48 See Danforth, supra note 1, at 2591.
49 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 cmt.
50 See Danforth, supra note 1, at 2571.
51 The Comment to the 2005 amendment to section 506 of the Code provides: "Under both
Sections 504 and 506, a trust is discretionary even if the discretion is expressed in the form of a
standard, such as a provision directing a trustee to pay for a beneficiary's support." UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 506 cmt. Furthermore, the amendment "addresses the situation where the terms of the trust
couple language of discretion with language of dictation .... Despite the presence of the imperative
shall,' the provision is discretionary, not mandatory." Id.
52 Id. § 503(b)(2).
53 Id. § 503 cmt.
54 Id. § 157(b).
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Restatements. The drafters explain that "[m]ost of these cases involve
claims by governmental entities, which the drafters concluded are better
handled by the enactment of special legislation as authorized by subsection
(b)(3)" of section 503.56 Yet necessary supplies and services, including,
for example, medical assistance or groceries, 57 may be provided by private
parties and may prove even more critical to the beneficiary's well-being
than the attorney hired to protect the beneficiary's interest in the trust.
Thus, the provision has the flavor of special interest group rent-seeking by
attorneys.
The premise underlying the "necessaries" exception rejected by the
Code drafters is that a settlor would not have intended to deny access to
trust funds if essential for the beneficiary's basic well-being. Admittedly,
this conclusion as to settlor intent is disputable. But having accepted the
premise in the case of the beneficiary's attorney, the Code should
consistently apply it to other providers of essential benefits. If providers
are not protected, then they will lose incentive to meet essential needs.58
Of course, as the drafters suggest, legislation can be enacted to add them,
but this is not an adequate response. The same could be said of any other
Code provision. The Code qua Code ought to present a comprehensive,
integrated body of rules. The drafters should strive, to the extent
attainable, for uniform adoption.
The failure of Article V to recognize an exception for tort claimants is
also curious. This failure is especially difficult to reconcile with the
exceptions for current spouses, former spouses, and children. When the
tort causes grievous injury, the claimant may be in more desperate straits
than, for example, the former spouse, who, in contrast, may be fully
capable of supporting himself. Why, then, recognize an exception for the
spouse and not the victim of the tort? A rationale offered for the exception
for a spouse or child is that the spouse or child did not enter into the
relationship on a commercial basis like other creditors and was, thus,
unable to protect himself.59 This contention, however, is of little merit, at
least with respect to a spouse, if we assume that he has independent
judgment and an ex ante ability to negotiate the financial conditions of the
relationship. Moreover, to the extent it is true, it is no less true of the
victims of torts perpetrated by trust beneficiaries.
The exceptional treatment of spouses and children is further reflected
55 Id. § 59(b), applying to both "services or supplies provided for necessities or for the protection
of the beneficiary's interest in the trust."
56 Id. § 503 cmt.
57 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59 cmt. C (2003).
58 See id.
59 See, e.g., 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 8, § 157.1, at 192. The "public policy," a.k.a.
moral, dimension is what truly bothers Professor Scott: "It would be shocking indeed to permit a
husband to receive and enjoy the whole of the income from a large trust fund and to make no
provision for his needy dependents."
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in section 504. That section entitles them to sue the trustee directly, if the
trustee has not complied with a standard of distribution or has abused his
discretion. Other creditors are barred from suing the trustee, even though
there is trustee abuse. Rather, only the beneficiary can sue. No
explanation is given as a justification for the distinction drawn. Again, no
indication is offered as to how other creditors are to vindicate their rights.
Section 504 thus lends particular credence to Professor Danforth's
argument that the Code is not particularly creditor-friendly, at least with
respect to a claimant who is not a current spouse, former spouse, or child
with a judgment or court order for support or maintenance.
Unlike distributions from trusts in which the trustee has absolute
discretion or is governed by a standard, section 506 allows a creditor to
reach a mandatory distribution that has been improperly withheld.
Especially since this provision would not apply to trusts governed by a
standard, its applicability appears limited. Even in the case of a mandatory
distribution, however, the creditor must wait a "reasonable time after the
designated distribution date."'60 The drafters express concern that if the
creditors can demand immediate payment, the spendthrift provision
"would become largely a nullity. '61 To justify the creditors reaching
directly into the trust, the Comment to section 506 states that "payments
mandated by the express terms of the trust are in effect being held by the
trustee as agent for the beneficiary and should be treated as part of the
beneficiary's personal assets. '62
But why does an agency relationship only arise after a "reasonable
time?" Moreover, if this agency relationship arises for mandatory
payments, why not also in cases of trustee abuse, when payments subject
to a standard or discretion are involved? Precisely because a legal fiction
is involved, the drafters owe an explanation as to why one abusive
situation allows invasion of the trust and another does not. Unfortunately,
no explanation is forthcoming.
CONCLUSION
Professor Danforth has produced an excellent, comprehensive study
of the workings of Article V of the UTC. He has successfully debunked
the argument that, taken as a whole, Article V undermines spendthrift
trusts. However, the story is more complex than he lets on. The question
of restraints on alienation, as Dean Griswold emphasized, is fundamentally
a policy question. 63 It entails inevitable normative judgments, which ought
60 UNIE. TRUST CODE § 506(b).
61 Id. § 506 cmt.
62 Id.
63 See GRISWOLD, supra note 20, § 555 ("The fundamental question, then, is whether spendthrift
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to be based on extensive data and debate. Little of this appears to have
occurred in the case of Article V.
One response to this critique might be that Article V aims simply to
preserve the traditional protections accorded debtor-beneficiaries. If so,
the merit of those "majority-of-states" rules should be explained. Their
age or popularity ought not be the determining factor.64 Another response
might be that Article V represents a sensible balancing of competing
interests of settlor intent, beneficiary protection, and creditor claims. This
argument is no more persuasive. Without a principled foundation for the
overall regime, the individual rules cannot be defended as part of an
integrated Code, and the utility of a Code itself is called into question.
Hopefully, as part of their periodic review, the drafters will engage in the
future in a more serious consideration of the underlying issues associated
with Article V. Article V is a central component of the Code, one with
great practical significance. It deserves greater reflection and deeper
analysis than the current version demonstrates.
trusts should be sustained.").
64 Karl Llewellyn's insight is helpful here: "[T]he rule follows where its reason leads; where the
reason stops, there stops the rule." KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 157-58 (1951).
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